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COMPUTING THE GROWTH RATE IN 
PHYSICIAN PRACTICE REVENUE
The Most Common Mistake in Medical Practice Valuation’s Zero-Sum Game
By M a rk  O . D ie tr ic h , C P A/ABV
Whether forecasting future cashflows 
for a Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) 
model or estimating terminal growth 
for use in determining a capitaliza­
tion rate, one of the most critical 
judgments a valuation analyst makes 
is deciding the growth rate in rev­
enue and free cash flow to invested 
capital or cash flow to equity. Overes­
timating the growth rate is probably 
the most common mistake in the val­
uation of physician practices and 
other healthcare entities dependent 
upon the Resource Based Relative 
Value Scale (RBRVS) and the Health­
care Common Procedure Coding Sys­
tem (HCPCS) including Current Pro­
cedural Terminology (CPT).1 The 
other entities include imaging cen­
ters, laboratories, and certain diag­
nostic facilities. In addition to physi­
cians, physical and occupational 
therapists, podiatrists, and chiroprac­
tors are also included.
Revenue Growth consists, of 
course, of at least two components: 
growth in the number of units of ser­
vices provided and growth in the price 
per unit of service. A valuation analyst 
should assess both of these in devel­
oping a forecast. Number of units 
depends upon the work capacity of 
the providers (physicians, nurse prac­
titioners, physician assistants, etc.) in 
the practice, the demand for their 
services, competitors, the capacity of 
the physical facility, and a host of 
other factors. Price per unit in medi­
cine, unlike many other areas of the 
economy, is principally based upon 
fees set by the government and third 
party insurers such as HMOs and is 
outside the control of the practice 
and of consumers.2
PRICE PER UNIT
Generically, the Medicare program is 
providing physicians with a fee 
increase of 1.5% in 2005. This is a 
result of specific legislation overturn­
ing a scheduled decrease of 4.5% 
based upon the statutory form ula 
which determ ines the annual fee 
change. It is important to understand 
that the statutory formula is still in 
place; the legislation only overturned 
the result for 2005. Future cuts are 
estimated at between 3.5% and 5.0% 
per annum in the absence of further 
legislation.
Fee increases are measured in the 
Medicare Conversion Factor, which is 
applied to the Relative Value Units 
(RVUs)3 assigned to each procedure 
or service performed by physicians. 
M edicare fees per RVU have
1 CPT Codes are © the American Medical Association.
2 Exceptions include services not covered by insurance such as cosmetic plastic surgery or LASIK eye surgery.
3 RVUs in physician billing are analogous to hours in an accounting firm: the more RVUs performed, the higher 
the fee. Unlike hourly billing rates, which can vary, the RVU rate is usually fixed. More complex work is assigned 
a higher number of RVUs rather than a higher billing rate.
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increased only 3.3% in 7 years (see 
figure 1 below). Although part of 
this annual fee increase computation 
involves a complex analysis of the 
increases in physician practice costs 
from inflation and other factors, the 
key to understanding the annual 
Update Adjustment Factor, is that it 
is designed “to reflect success or fail­
ure in meeting the expenditure target 
that the law refers to as ‘allowed 
ex p e n d itu re s .’” These allowed 
expend itu res are an aggregate 
amount (see table 1) equal to actual 
expend itu res in a base period  
updated each year by the Sustainable 
Growth Rate or SGR.
Table 1 shows the estimated pay­
ments in $l,000s by Medicare to vari­
ous physician specialties during  
2005, along with the changes in the 
aggregate RVUs for each of those 
specialties. Reductions in RVUs indi­
cate that the services provided by 
those specialties have been devalued, 
while increases indicate that services 
have been revalued upwards. Basi­
cally, ophthalmologists pay more
Figure 1: Medicare Conversion Factor
Table 1: Medicare's Zero-Sum Game
Interventional radiology 
Ophthalmology 
Pathology 
Vascular surgery 
Nurse practitioners 
Physical & occupational therapy 
Lab
Diagnostic facilities 
Chiropractors 
All others 
Total
than $45 million out of their collec­
tive pockets to subsidize increases in 
payments to specialties such as inter­
ventional radiology, pathology and 
vascular surgery. Also on the losing 
side of the zero-sum game are Physi­
cal and Occupational Therapists.
Interventional radiology is a rela­
tively new specialty in the world of
Payments RVU change Dollars
191,000 3.00% 5,730
4,566,000 -1.00% (45,660)
846,000 2.00% 16,920
487,000 4.00% 19,480
556,000 -1.00% (5,560)
998,000 -2.00% (19,960)
452,000 6.00% 27,120
879,000 2.00% 17,580
658,000 -1.00% (6,580)
56,170,000 -0.02% (9,070)
65,803,000 -0.00% 0
physician practices. Historically, radi­
ologists “read films” and did not per­
form procedures. Now, newly gradu­
ated  residen ts and re-tra ined  
radiologists are performing increas­
ingly complex procedures, some of 
which require skills comparable to 
those of surgeons. As new proce­
dures are developed, RVUs are 
assigned to them. Because the over­
all level of spending on physician 
services by Medicare is set by formula 
each year (as shown in table 1, the 
allowance for 2005 is $65.8 billion) 
as new procedures are added and 
valued, old p rocedures m ust be 
devalued!
PRODUCER PRICE INDEX
The Producer Price Index (PPI) pro­
gram measures the average change 
over tim e in the selling prices 
received by domestic producers for 
their output. Fee-for-service reim-
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bursem ent as represented by the 
Producer Price Index for physician 
services has a com pound rate of 
increase of 1.82% for the last nine 
years with 1994 as the base year; the 
annual rate has rem ained in the 
vicinity of 2.0% th roughou t this 
period. Physician practice costs tend 
to go up by more than the rate of 
inflation—a rate greater than 3%. 
Thus, profit margins are under con­
stant erosion.
This empirical data reflects the 
general lack of negotiating clout in 
the physician community due to the 
large market shares held by major 
HMOs in densely populated metro­
politan market areas, where most of 
the insured population resides. The 
Federal T rade Com m ission and 
Department of Justice anti-trust divi­
sions have intervened repeatedly 
against physicians undertaking col­
lective negotiating to counter the 
monopolistic or oligopolistic power 
of HMOs in these markets.
External evidence of annual fee 
increases, such as those found in 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
C onsum er Price d a ta4 or press 
reports, will include the effect of the 
so-called cost-shifting phenomenon. 
This phenomenon causes the stated 
charge for a particular service to be 
significantly in excess of what is actu­
ally paid for that service—unless you 
happen to be uninsured. The unin­
sured include the poor and those
unable to obtain insurance, as well as 
those who choose not to have health 
insurance to avoid the cost, gam­
bling they will not need the cover­
age.
Table 2: Year 1 Revenue
Insurance Coverage Units
Charge 
per unit
Payment 
per unit
Collection
rate
Net
Revenue
Medicare 400 100 50.00 50.00% 20,000
HMOs 300 100 55.00 55.00% 16,500
Commercial insurers 200 100 60.00 60.00% 12,000
Self-pay (uninsured) 100 100 15.00 15.00% 1.500
1000 50,000
Expenses 30.000
Profit 20,000
A CASE IN POINT
The following example illustrates 
how this phenomenon takes place. 
In the initial year, a physician pro­
vides 1,000 services to patients with a 
stated charge of $100 for the service. 
However, because of fees established 
by Medicare and insurance compa­
nies, the physician collects substan­
tially less than the stated charge. The 
payment per unit is net of contrac­
tual allowances from Medicare and 
insurance companies, and bad debts, 
the latter representing patients who 
do not pay and is lim ited in this 
example to the self-pay category. 
The collection rate is the portion of
the charge per unit that is actually 
paid.
The practice is budgeting for Year 
2 and wants to increase physician 
income by 3%. Since the practice is at 
capacity, no additional units of ser­
vices are expected to be provided. 
Expenses are expected to increase by 
3.5%, so that the revenue target for 
Year 2 is $51,650, requiring a net 
increase of 3.3% in fees. (See table 3.)
The process of setting the new 
charge (which only self-pay patients 
pay) requires knowing or forecasting 
what increases will be received from 
insurance companies. The previous 
discussion indicated that Medicare 
fees will increase5 by 1.5% and that 
historically, health  insurers have
given increases averaging 2%. Com­
m ercial insurers are non-HMOS 
which usually have smaller market 
share and less negotiating leverage 
and therefore can be expected to 
give, on average, slightly b e tte r  
increases than the HMOs. The antic­
ipated charges are reflected in table 
4, resulting in $49,550 of 2002 net 
revenue. The remaining $2,100 of 
net revenue must be made up from 
collections from uninsured patients. 
Of these, only those who lack insur­
ance by choice and who have finan­
cial means are likely to pay a signifi­
can t sum, and the h istorical 
experience is that 15% of the self-pay
4 BLS does claim to attempt to adjust for this factor to get ‘real’ price increases.
5 On average, and for purposes of the example, assume this practice experiences the “average.”
3
C P A  Expert W in te r 2 0 0 5
Table 3: Year 2 Targeted 
Revenue
Target Profit
in 2002 103.00% 20,600
Expected
expenses 103.50% 31,050
Target net 
revenue in 
year 2
Net revenue 
in year 1
Average 
increase in 
net fees
51,650
50,000
103.30%
category is collected. The result is 
that gross charges must be $14,000 
for the 15% collection ratio to result 
in the needed revenue of $2,100, 
and this requires a gross charge per 
unit of service of $1,400, 40% higher 
than Year 2001. (See table 4.)
Table 5 summarizes the result of 
the calculations.
In a practice that is at service 
capacity, a relatively small increase in 
operating expenses—3.5% in the 
example—coupled with smaller per­
centage increases from most of its 
payors, must raise prices dramatically 
to the uninsured to stay even. One 
observation is that the “uninsured by 
choice” who have economic means 
are subsidizing the poor and indi­
gent who cannot pay in any event, as 
well as subsidizing the discounts 
given to the Medicare program and 
HMOs.
Among the many other implica­
tions of the above example, a valua­
tion analyst cannot rely upon a trend 
in the charge for a service, he or she 
must look at what is actually being 
paid for that service. In valuing col­
lectible accounts receivable, the ana­
lyst cannot rely upon the amount 
shown in the receivables detail, but 
has to analyze the receivables by 
insurance category to determ ine 
how much is likely to be collected. 
Blindly “ballparking” a collectibility 
factor without looking at historical
results and the age of the receivable 
will simply not work.
PAYOR MIX
A nother im p lica tion—or, m ore 
accurately, conclusion—is that the 
financial success of a medical prac­
tice or other healthcare provider is 
irretrievably tied to the “payor mix” 
or the underlying insurance cover­
age (or lack thereof) of its patients. 
The profit margin per dollar of rev­
enue will vary wildly from insurer to 
insurer and from market to market. 
Physician incomes tend to be higher 
in the South and lower in the North­
east according to MGMA data— 
although this can vary by specialty.
Given the facts of physician 
income, use of the Market Approach6 
based on revenues as a sole method
Table 4: Calculation of Gross Charge
Year 2 Units
Payment 
per unit 01
Payment 
Increase per unit 02
Net
Revenue
Medicare 400 50.00 1.50% 50.75 20,300
HMOs 300 55.00 2.00% 56.10 16,830
Commercial insurers 200 60.00 3.50% 62.10 12,420
Self-pay 100 15.00 TBD TBD TBD
Expected Revenue 1000 49,550
Target 02 net revenue 51.650
Net revenue from self-pay 100 21 2,100
Expected collection rate 15.00%
Target Charges 14,000
Number of units 10
Target Charge per Unit 1,400
of determining value cannot possibly 
yield an accurate result, as there is no 
way to know how much incom e/ 
cashflow those revenues generated— 
and cash flow to capital or equity is 
what hypothetical investors buy. Even 
more suspect are so-called “goodwill” 
values based upon practice revenues 
matched with so-called “goodwill” 
percentages from the Goodwill Reg­
istry. In an industry where payor mix 
along with operating expenses drives
profit, revenues are a weak indicator 
at best of cash profits.
GROWTH IN UNITS
For the discrete forecast period asso­
ciated with a DCF, the analyst may 
find that the practice has the capac­
ity to see additional patients or pro­
vide additional services. The growth 
rate during the years of the forecast 
in units of service provided needs to 
be evaluated carefully for reason­
ableness. Table 6 h ighlights the 
im pact of various growth rate 
assum ptions on the volume of a 
practice p resently  seeing 4,500 
patient encounters per year (a typi­
cal level for an Internal Medicine 
practice).
With a growth rate of 4%, at the 
end of the Year 3, the practice is see­
ing more than 5,000 patients. This 
would be busy for an Internal Medi­
cine practice and likely represents 
capacity, unless additional providers 
are added. If additional providers 
are to be added, then the analyst 
needs to consider the additional 
expenses that the practice would 
incur as well as the fact that prac­
tices typically lose money as new 
providers are added until they see 
sufficient patients to cover addi-
6 The Stark regulations defining Fair Market Value indicate that only transactions “in a particular market at the time of acquisition” are relevant!
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Table 5: Year 2 Revenue
Year 2 Units
Charge 
per unit
Payment 
per unit
Net
Revenue
Medicare 400 140 50.75 20,300
HMOs 300 140 56.10 16,830
Commercial insurers 200 140 62.10 12,420
Self-pay 100 140 21.00 2,100
51,650
tional overhead as well as their own 
compensation.
O bservation: One exam ple I 
encountered  during a review on 
behalf of the acquirer of a valuation 
prepared on behalf of the seller was 
a projected 10% per annum growth 
rate in the first three years of a five 
year DCF for a primary care practice. 
During my site visit, I noted that the
location already had a serious park­
ing problem—there were only seven 
spaces and no potential for expan­
sion.
CONCLUSION
In light of the above discussion, what 
is the correct terminal growth rate 
for determining a capitalization rate? 
The reasonable range seems to be
just under 2% to no more than 3% 
for price per unit of service. Rates 
larger than this require that the ana­
lyst demonstrate that the practice 
has the ability to continue to add 
capacity and patients into perpetuity.
Offering guidance as to a reason­
able unit growth rate during a dis­
crete forecast period for a specific 
practice is very difficult because it 
requires a careful analysis of the 
particu lar situation. Key to that 
analysis is assessing the capacity of 
the physicians or other providers in 
the practice to see more patients, as 
well as the capacity of the existing 
overhead structure to absorb more 
patients.
M ark O. Dietrich, C P A /A B V , is w ith Diet­
rich &  Wilson, PC, Framingham, Massachu­
s e t ts .  He can  be c o n ta c te d  a t  
dietrich@ cpa.net.
Table 6: The Impact of Various Growth Rate Assumptions
Base Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Visits
Growth Rate
4,500
4.00% 4,680 4,867 5,062 5,264 5,475 5,694 5,922 6,159
Growth Rate 5.00% 4,725 4,961 5,209 5,470 5,743 6,030 6,332 6,649
Growth Rate 6.00% 4,770 5,056 5,360 5,681 6,022 6,383 6,766 7,172
Growth Rate 7.00% 4,815 5,152 5,513 5,899 6,311 6,753 7,226 7,732
Growth Rate 8.00% 4,860 5,249 5,669 6,122 6,612 7,141 7,712 8,329
Growth Rate 9.00% 4,905 5,346 5,828 6,352 6,924 7,547 8,226 8,967
Growth Rate 10.00% 4,950 5,445 5,990 6,588 7,247 7,972 8,769 9,646
FRAUD AWARENESS FOR VALUATION 
PROFESSIONALS
By Robin E. T a y lo r, C P A /A B V , CFE, CVA, CBA
Recent events have highlighted the 
subject of financial statement fraud 
in corporate America. Such notable 
companies as Enron, WorldCom, 
and H ealthS outh  have received 
almost constant publicity, but for the 
wrong reasons: allegations of fraud. 
Investors have suffered losses in the 
billions. Consequently, increased 
scrutiny has fallen on management,
the Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC), and the accounting profes­
sion. In addition, some confidence 
has been lost in the United States’ 
financial markets.
Certainly, the risk associated with 
operations of the enterprise and the 
reliability of its financial statements 
can have a profound impact on cor­
porate valuation. Although much of
the recent publicity has focused on 
large public companies, financial 
statement fraud occurs in organiza­
tions of all sizes. Additionally, the 
fraud schemes used and the observ­
able symptoms are similar regardless 
of company size.
Even though a valuation assign­
ment is not an “audit” of the subject 
company or a formal fraud examina­
tion, the valuation analyst should not 
be blind to obvious signs of fraud. 
The analyst should carefully consider 
such signs and symptoms and com­
municate their existence to the client 
as is appropriate to the assignment 
and our professional responsibilities
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as CPAs. I am not suggesting 
an expansion of the engage­
ment’s scope or a change in 
its objectives, but increased 
awareness of the signs of 
fraud. Individual profession­
als can then determine the 
appropria te  response to 
identified fraud risk factors.
The skill set of valuation 
professionals is highly analyt­
ical and well suited to spot­
ting signs of fraud. Past stud­
ies, however, have shown 
that although CPAs are skill­
ful in detecting these signs 
and symptoms (such as 
through the application of 
analytical procedures), they 
are often unskilled in inter­
preting what they see. They 
spot the symptoms but often 
cannot diagnose the disease.
VALUATORS SHOULD CARE 
ABOUT DETECTING FRAUD
A valuation engagement is a 
consulting service, which by 
definition does not involve 
attestation services. It is not 
designed to find fraud. We 
com m unicate this fact to 
clients and the report user, 
protecting ourselves by our 
engagement letter and the 
limiting conditions disclosed 
in our valuation reports.
Regardless of the engage­
m ent’s purpose, however, 
proper valuation often relies 
on identify ing expected  
earnings capacity. Reported 
financial information is ana­
lyzed, inquiries and research 
are perform ed, and then 
the financial statements may 
be adjusted to move from 
reported earnings to nor­
malized earnings. Certainly 
if the valuation analyst 
believes that the reported 
figures have been distorted 
through fraudulent manipu­
lation, adjustments may be 
in order. This approach is
A Fraud Detection Framework
The AICPA course “Identifying Fraudulent Financial Transactions” (a one-day 
course) presents four steps for detecting fraud. I highly recommend this course to 
those wishing to expand their skills in this area. The approach to fraud detection fol­
lows a structured process. You first have to identify the organization’s fraud expo­
sures. This involves reviewing both qualitative and quantitative factors related to man­
agement and directors, the organization’s external relationships, its internal 
organization, industry factors, and finally, its financial characteristics.
Identifying fraud exposures is very similar to the process of understanding the 
company in the context of business valuation. In both, you are looking for critical risk 
factors. The following are examples of potential fraud exposures:
MANAGEMENT
• Criminal history of certain management members
• High turnover of management positions
• Performance-based pay systems
• Autocratic management style
EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS
• Related party transactions including large or unusual transactions and large trans­
actions timed near the end of the year
• Unusual borrowing arrangements
• Significant receivables to payables
INTERNAL ORGANIZATION
• New entity
• Overly complex structure
INDUSTRY FACTORS
• Declining industry
• Type of industry
• Company performance contrary to industry’s
FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS
• Positive earnings but negative cash flow for extended periods
• Rapid growth
• Major account balances that are based on significant accounting estimates or com­
plex accounting pronouncements
• Weak financial position
Next, you need to identify what fraud symptoms you would expect to see, given the 
fraud exposure you have identified. You then search for those symptoms and, finally, 
follow up on what you have observed. Such steps would be taken in a formal fraud 
examination and, to a great extent, in a GAAS audit (compliance with SAS No. 99).
The process is also iterative, rather than linear. Information discovered at a later 
“step” may cause you to reconsider earlier conclusions.
Again, one thing we do not want to do is cross over the line of converting a valua­
tion engagement into something it was not designed to be. My caution here is that the 
valuation professional should not turn a blind eye to such fraud exposures and fraud 
symptoms when they are identified. The client at least should be informed of any trou­
bling signs. Additionally, as indicated earlier, certain engagements may require more 
emphasis on suspicions of understated or overstated financial performance. This 
should be covered in the engagement letter for those specific assignments.
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no different from that used in adjust­
ing h istorical perfo rm ance for 
unusual and nonrecurring items.
Several valuation issues we face in 
such situations are:
• Obtaining knowledge of the fraud 
and its amount (Was it reasonably 
knowable?)
• Determining the amount of the 
fraud.
Occasionally, however, we will be 
engaged to perform  services in 
which the po ten tia l presence of 
fraud is a more direct concern in 
determ ining financial fairness or 
“equity.” Here, the appropriate stan­
dard of value may be other than fair 
m arket value. In such cases, the 
assumption of possessing “reason­
able knowledge of relevant facts” by 
“hypothetical buyers and sellers” may 
not be relevant. Examples of such 
engagements may include:
• Assisting in due diligence and 
pricing activities on acquisitions
• Fairness opinions
• Divorce valuations
• Damages quantification
• Minority oppression cases
Often the media focuses on situa­
tions in which an earnings overstate­
ment is alleged. In some of the situa­
tions listed above, such as divorce, 
the fraudster’s goal may be to under­
state financial performance. Man­
agement’s motivations and past ten­
dencies must be examined.
Even in other types of engage­
ments, the CPA valuation profes­
sional should not turn a blind eye to 
the red flags associated with financial 
statement fraud. Honing our analyti­
cal skills in this area also increases 
opportunities to obtain other types 
of engagem ents in which we can 
effectively serve the client’s interest.
TYPES OF FRAUD
There are three major classes of 
fraud:
1. Financial reporting fraud: Fraud 
against the users of financial 
information
2. Asset misappropriation: Also known 
as asset theft.
3. Corruption: This involves such mat­
ters as bribery and kickbacks.
All three types of fraud can distort
the financial statements. There also 
may be interplay of the fraud types 
in an organization. For example, an 
env ironm en t w herein financial 
reporting fraud exists or is encour­
aged from the top may, in turn , 
encourage employees at lower levels 
of the organization to seek opportu­
nities for asset misappropriation.
How does this happen? Manage­
m ent that is actively engaged in 
financial reporting fraud schemes 
may be distracted from other inter­
nal issues. This was alleged in the 
case at MCI (pre WorldCom), where 
the focus on increasing revenues at 
almost any cost fostered a culture 
that reduced emphasis on internal 
controls and asset protection. As a 
result, a mid-level employee was able 
to defraud MCI and others of mil­
lions of dollars.
FINANCIAL REPORTING FRAUD
For our purposes, this article will 
focus on financial reporting fraud. 
First, le t’s review some basic con­
cepts. FASB Statement of Financial 
Accounting Concepts No. 1 Objectives 
of Financial Reporting by Business Enter­
prises states: “Financial reporting is 
not an end in itself but is intended 
to provide information that is useful 
in making business and economic deci­
sions— for making reasoned choices 
among alternative uses of scarce resources 
in the conduct of business and eco­
nomic activities.” [Emphasis added.] 
Certainly, an incorrect financial 
statement affects the user’s ability to 
make reasoned choices.
Accounting misstatements can be 
caused by error (the unintentional) 
or fraud. We can make errors with 
integrity, thank goodness! Fraud, 
however, reflects a lack of personal 
integrity. In either case, the financial 
statements are less useful than they 
should be.
According to a published study of 
public company financial restate­
m ents for 2003, the areas most
involved in accounting m isstate­
ments were:
• Reserves and contingencies
(17.5%)
• Revenue recognition (16.2%)
• Equity (15.7%)
• Capitalization of assets (10.1%)
• Inventory (5.7%)
Over the last five years, however, 
revenue recognition has been the 
leading problem area when fraud 
was involved.
DEFINING FINANCIAL REPORTING FRAUD
Financial statement fraud involves 
intentional actions, misstatements, or 
omissions to hide or distort the real 
financial condition of an entity to 
deceive the users. There are no accidental 
frauds!
The financial statement users, for 
our purposes, are of two main types:
1. Those using published financials 
as gauges of financial strength for 
credit decisions, investment deci­
sions, or internal m anagement 
decisions.
2. Those using financial statements 
as an analytical tool for valuation 
assignments or fraud investiga­
tions (assisting others in deter­
mining courses of action).
Fraud can certainly be a material
valuation issue to users. For example, 
a price/earnings (P/E) ratio of 10 to 
1 mathematically means that an earn­
ings overstatem ent (for reasons 
unknown) could cause an overstate­
ment of market capitalization equal 
to 10 times the amount of the fraud 
(net of tax implications). Obviously, 
this “cold math” ignores many other 
factors that go into determ ining 
proper corporate valuations, but the 
potential valuation impact is certainly 
there. In addition, perceptions of 
fraud in the marketplace can cause 
investors to lose confidence even in 
good com panies. The perceived 
added risk can lower market multi­
ples and increase the demanded rate 
of return.
T hat brings up an in teresting  
issue or two. Assume you have a valu­
ation assignm ent for a m inority
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interest in a closely held business in 
which the price of equity was deter­
mined using fraudulently prepared 
financial statements that significantly 
overstated net income. The presence 
of the fraud was unknown and rea­
sonably unknowable to the hypothet­
ical buyer and seller. No adjustments 
for the fraud were made. Would you 
consider the value you determined 
(based on earnings) to be reflective 
of fair market value?
A similar issue could surface when 
using market multiples from publicly 
traded companies that had signifi­
cant fraud issues as of your valuation 
date. In hindsight, the financial per­
formance of the public company was 
obviously distorted because of the 
fraud but the fraud was unknown to 
the market as of your valuation date. 
Is your valuation still reflective of fair 
market value? Those knowing the 
whole truth would have seen a differ­
ent financial picture from that which 
was observable and would have used 
different market multiples.
Are additional valuation adjust­
m ents to the m arket m ultiples 
appropriate in this case? Recently, I 
posed this question to several top val­
uation experts and the consensus 
was that your conclusion was still at 
fair market value because your con­
clusion was based on what was 
known or reasonably knowable to 
the market participants as of the val­
uation date. Do you agree?
THE CLASSIC FRAUD TRIANGLE
Frauds generally can be explained 
with what is called the fraud triangle, 
which has the following three “cor­
ners:”
1. Need or pressure
2. Opportunity
3. Rationalization
How do these three “co rners” 
relate to financial statement fraud? 
The classic fraud triangle starts with 
individual motivations, such as a per­
ceived need by or external pressures 
on the perpetrator. Greed is also a 
strong m otivation. Pressures for 
financial statement fraud include:
• Meeting analysts’ expectations
• Increasing reported profits for 
purposes of incentive-based com­
pensation
• Covering management failures
• O btain ing  financing  or m ore 
favorable loan terms, or meeting 
loan covenants
• Pressures from  h igher levels 
within the organization exerted 
through fear, intim idation, or 
threats of job loss.
Opportunity arises when the per­
petrator believes the fraud scheme 
can be successful and no t be 
detected. Accounting systems may be 
extremely complex, thereby allowing 
the fraud to rem ain hidden. The 
perpetrator believes the system itself 
offers protection against discovery. 
Alternatively, he or she exerts pres­
sure downward on others in the 
organization  to hide the fraud 
scheme or to not question account­
ing or financial reporting decisions 
mandated from “on high.”
Additionally, management may 
override internal controls. Sadly, 
management may simply attempt to 
fool or intimidate the auditors. For 
exam ple, they may th rea ten  the 
auditors with loss of the client or loss 
of other consulting engagements if 
they question explanations or seek 
adequate documentation.
Exam ples of opportun ities  to 
commit financial statement fraud 
include:
• Absence of proper oversights by 
the Board of Directors
• Weak or nonexistent internal con­
trols
• Override of internal controls
• A corporate culture that fosters 
fraud (what is the ethical message 
that comes from  top m anage­
ment?)
• Complex accounting rules
• Complex organizational structure
• Financial estimates requiring sig­
nificant judgment.
Fraudsters have the ability to jus­
tify their actions. They do not view 
their acts as criminal, at least initially. 
Rationalizations of financial state­
ment fraud may include:
• “Everyone else is doing it.”
• “We’re doing it to protect share­
holder value.”
• “It’s just a timing issue. Future 
performance will cure the current 
problem.”
• “It will never happen again.”
• “We’re protecting the jobs of our 
people and this community.”
A situation in which all three ele­
ments of the fraud triangle are pre­
sent creates the greatest fraud expo­
sure. For example, despite pressures 
to commit the fraud, without fraud 
opportunities, because internal con­
trols are strong and the corporate 
culture fosters integrity, fraud expo­
sure is limited. The valuation analyst 
can obtain knowledge of such quali­
tative elements during management 
interviews or the site visit.
INDUSTRY FACTORS
We also need to remember that cer­
tain industries have historically been 
more prone to fraudulent reporting. 
One study of public companies, for 
example, found that about 78% of 
reported public company financial 
statement frauds involved companies 
listed on the NASDAQ. About 15% 
were listed on the NYSE. Think of 
the nature of many of the NASDAQ 
companies: high-tech, telecommuni­
cations, bio-tech, start-up companies, 
and those experiencing rapid growth 
and having a high need for capital to 
fund growth. Such entities would nat­
urally receive greater scrutiny.
SELECTED FINANCIAL STATEMENT AREAS
Since we’re dealing with intent to 
deceive, not accidental misstatements, 
let’s review some of the strategies 
that continually account for the 
majority of intentionally misleading 
reporting practices:
• Reporting revenue (timing issues, 
bogus sales)
• Boosting income with one-time 
gains
• Shifting curren t expenses to a 
later or earlier period (timing)
• Capitalization policies
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• Failing to disclose major liabili­
ties—contingent or real
• D eferring cu rren t profits and 
using them  to offset expected 
future losses
Another term used for some of 
these actions is earnings management. 
It has occurred  for hundreds of 
years. Management can make legiti­
m ate decisions on tim ing, and 
accounting allows the use of esti­
mates in many areas, but not with the 
intent to deceive the user.
Nothing is wrong with legitimate 
“earnings management” techniques, 
just as nothing is illegal in proper tax 
planning (tax avoidance v. tax eva­
sion). Sometimes, however, financial 
statement fraud is hidden behind the 
mask of “professional judgm ent” in 
the application of accounting princi­
ples, such as the timing of revenue 
recognition. Generally accepted 
accounting principles have to be flexi­
ble to allow for differing circum ­
stances. Overly aggressive application 
of accounting principles, however, 
can be fraudulent when there is intent 
to deceive users. Additionally, proving 
there was such “intent” remains one 
of the most difficult elements in win­
ning a financial fraud case.
REVENUE FRAUD
As we know, revenue is often the sin­
gle largest item on financial state­
ments. For right or wrong, investors 
weigh revenue very heavily in mak­
ing decisions. The trend in revenue 
growth is one of the most sensitive 
factors in changes in the market cap­
italization of a company, especially 
high tech or “new economy” compa­
nies. During the run up of “dot com” 
stock prices, often no earnings were 
reported. Thus, the focus shifted to 
other valuation factors, including 
revenue growth.
If revenue growth is what 
investors want to see, there is pres­
sure to give it to them. One analyst 
remarked, “The top line is the bot­
tom line for many investors today.”
In spite of all of the sophisticated 
accounting systems and complicated
M ajor Red Flags
Regardless of the type of organization, the presence of certain red flags 
should be considered in determining the potential of fraud. The following is 
a partial list of these flags:
• Management places undue emphasis on meeting earnings projections 
or other quantitative targets.
• The control environment within the company is weak.
• Management compensation depends on meeting unreasonable quanti­
fied targets set by others.
• Operating and financial decisions are dominated by a single person or a 
few persons.
• Management seems overly interested in complex accounting matters.
• An unusually high percentage of the booked assets are intangibles.
• Management and key accounting personnel turnover is high.
• The client’s profitability is inadequate or inconsistent relative to the 
industry.
• There is a continuing large variance between cash flow and reported 
earnings.
• The client is facing adverse legal or regulatory issues.
• Conditions in the client’s industry are not positive for the long term.
• The client participated in several end of year (or end of quarter) transac­
tions that have a material effect on the financial statements. Alternatively, 
there are pending transactions that are viewed as critical to success.
• The client is in a period of rapid growth.
• Client growth has been fueled by continuous acquisitions.
The presence of these symptoms does not necessarily indicate that fraud 
exists. Their presence should, however, generate a heightened sense of 
awareness of fraud potentials. Remember also the critical need to synthe­
size all red flags observed during your review. Lifestyle and behavioral symp­
toms, lack of controls, and lack of proper documentation must be consid­
ered along with your analytical review of the numbers.
disclosures, many of the major fraud 
schemes remain relatively simple in 
their execution. Many involve simple 
classification issues in the statement 
of operations. These techniques do 
not change the bottom line of the 
company. The perpetrator, however, 
knows that financial statement users 
focus on different financial parame­
ters in different industries. When 
revenue growth is a key factor to 
users, normal offsets to sales may be 
moved down to other locations on 
the statement of operations. Alterna­
tively, large one-time gains from sales 
of certain assets or business units 
may be moved upward and classified 
as operating revenue. The “geogra­
phy” (location of presentation) has 
simply been adjusted.
For example, sales returns may be 
moved to cost of sales rather than
being netted against gross sales, pur­
chase discounts may be moved to 
operating revenue, or gains on sales 
of assets are moved to operating rev­
enue.
Other schemes may involve early 
revenue recognition, where revenue 
is booked before delivery, before 
right of cancellation, or before trans­
fer of title. Early revenue recognition 
can be perpetrated  with bill-and- 
hold schemes. One public company, 
for example, used a bill-and-hold 
strategy to inflate revenue by getting 
retailers to agree, in exchange for a 
discount, to purchase shipments of a 
company product six months before 
they were needed and allowing pay­
m ent for them  six m onths later. 
Another scheme involves booking 
the revenue as earned when a side 
agreement allows the customer to 
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return all unsold goods.
Fictitious sales comprise frequent 
frauds related to revenue recogni­
tion. Sales may be recorded to fake 
customers or may involve fake trans­
actions to legitimate customers who 
have no agreement to purchase, no 
knowledge of the transaction, and 
no intent to pay.
One unique recognition method 
we observed on a fraud case was that 
of a sales manager. He recognized 
the revenue on the sale of a unit 
when he “knew in his heart” it was a 
sale. I have yet to see this unique rev­
enue m ethod in any recognized 
accounting textbook.
So when is a sale a sale? Accord­
ing to SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 
101 on Revenue Recognition, four 
factors characterize a sale:
1. Persuasive evidence th a t an 
arrangement exists.
2. Delivery has occurred or services 
have been rendered.
3. Seller’s price is fixed and deter­
minable.
4. C ollectibility is reasonably 
assured.
These are “common sense” factors. 
When commenting on the above SEC 
bulletin, one accounting educator
In  t h e  K N O W
About when to use the mean, 
median, or both
By Jam es R. H itc h n e r, C P A /A B V , ASA
Averages are often used in valuation 
analyses. They are also often mis­
used. Did you know that there are 
three types of averages? There are 
the m ean, the m edian and the 
mode—what I call the “three M’s.” 
The mean is the sum of the observa­
tions divided by the num ber of 
observations. The m edian is the 
num ber in the middle that has as 
many observations above as below. 
This works just fine when you have 
an odd number of observations. For
lamented the need now for the SEC 
to promulgate the obvious.
EXPENSE FRAUD
Expense fraud is often perpetrated 
though inventory overstatem ent, 
capitalization of expenses, liability 
omissions, and understating or over­
stating reserves. W orldCom, for 
example, is alleged to have inflated 
earnings by counting routine operat­
ing expenses improperly as long­
term  capital expend itu res. This 
fraud reached $11 billion.
An unusual growth in the balance 
sheet or a changing asset mix in 
comparison to industry benchmarks 
can be symptomatic of fraud.
FINANCIAL STATEMENT ANALYSIS
The tools of financial statem ent 
analysis for the auditor, fraud exam­
iner and the valuation professional 
are similar. The level of follow up 
and inquiry will, however, likely dif­
fer. CPAs are familiar with the three 
major types of tools to be used: verti­
cal analysis, horizontal analysis, and 
ratio analysis.
Both accounting accidents and 
accounting fraud may generate the 
need for financial statement adjust­
an even number of observations, you 
take the mean average of the two 
middle numbers; that is the mid­
point or median. The mode is the 
num ber tha t appears m ost fre ­
quently. Generally, in the valuation 
world, only mean and median aver­
ages are used.
DECIDING WHICH TO USE
Now on to the real question. Should 
you use a mean, median, or both? 
Well, it depends. Some analysts 
decide ahead of time to go with just 
the mean or median. Others calcu­
late both and then make a decision 
as to which to rely upon. Of course, 
this assumes tha t an average is 
appropriate, which is not always the 
case. Sometimes individual observa­
tions are given more weight than an 
average. Assuming an average is
ments in performing a valuation. Both 
types of situations (material error or 
fraud) may also exhibit the same type 
of analytical symptoms during finan­
cial statement analysis. Our focus, 
however, is not on the accidental.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Fraud has always been with us and it 
always will be. No amount of regula­
tion or oversight will ever eliminate 
it. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act provi­
sions and SAS No. 99 are welcomed 
but will not put an end to financial 
statement fraud in public or private 
companies. Some people, given the 
opportunity and desire, will always 
break the rules and a ttem pt to 
“fleece the sheep.”
The issues of financial statement 
fraud are many and can be complex. 
Adding basic fraud awareness skills is 
an effective way to increase the qual­
ity of your valuation engagements 
and can open up additional engage­
ment opportunities.
Robin E. Taylor, CPA/ABV, CFE, CVA, CBA is 
a partner in the Birmingham, Alabama office 
of th e  reg io n a l a c c o u n tin g  firm , D ixon  
Hughes PLLC. He is a co-author of Financial 
Valuation: Applications and Models (Hobo­
ken, NJ: John Wiley &  Sons). He can be con­
tacted at rtaylor@dixon-hughes.com.
appropriate or desired, some ana­
lysts will calculate both and compare 
them. If they are close there is not 
an issue. But what if they are differ­
ent? Typically, if the m edian is 
higher than the mean, there may be 
outliers in the m ean calculation 
causing a downward bias. If the 
mean is higher, there may be out­
liers causing an upward bias. Using a 
median assists in reducing the effect 
of outliers. That is why many analysts 
prefer this type of average. Well, 
there  you have it—a sim ple but 
im portant concept to consider in 
preparing credible valuation conclu­
sions.
James R. Hitchner, C PA/AB V, ASA, is with 
th e  F inancial V a lu atio n  Group, A tla n ta , 
Georgia. He can be co ntacted  a t jh itch - 
ner@fvginternational.com.
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Harold Martin
A FORMIDABLE 
FOURSOME
Four ABV credential holders have been 
honored by the AICPA. Among them, the 
first woman to be inducted into the 
AICPA BV Hall of Fame.
Four AICPA members were honored 
at the AICPA National Business Valu­
ation C onference in O rlando, 
Florida, November 7-9, 2004. All 
honorees are holders of the AICPA’s 
Accredited in Business Valuation 
(ABV) credential.
VOLUNTEERS OF 
THE YEAR
The BV V olun­
teer of the Year 
Award recognizes 
CPAs who have 
advanced the 
ABV C redential 
and business val­
uation profession 
for CPAs through
their extraordinary service as a mem­
ber of an AICPA committee, sub­
committee, or task force. This year, 
Harold Martin and Ron Seigneur 
were honored for their commitment 
and service as Volunteers of the Year. 
H arold  M artin, CPA/ABV, ASA, 
CFE, is a p rinc ipal with Keiter, 
Stephens, Hurst, Gary & Shreaves, 
PC, Glen Allen, Virginia. He has 
served as editor of the AICPA ABV E- 
Valuation Alert since its inception in 
1999 and he is an editorial adviser to 
CPA Expert. He is also a member of 
the AICPA Task Force on valuation 
of pass-through entities and of the 
Appraisal Standards Board USPAP 
Task Force.
Ron Seigneur, CPA/ABV, CVA, is 
a partner with Seigneur Gustafson 
Knight, LLP, Lakewood, Colorado. 
He is recognized nationally as a con­
sultant to law firms on valuation and 
practice management issues and as 
an instructor and author on business 
valuation, leadership and profes­
Ron Seigneur
Tom Hilton
sional firm management. In 2001, he 
was inducted as a Fellow into the Col­
lege of Law Practice Management.
He has been a 
featured speaker 
at AICPA confer­
ences and at con­
ferences spon­
sored by the 
National Associa­
tion of Certified 
V aluation Ana­
lysts, as well as 
state bar associa­
tions, state CPA societies, and the 
Environmental Protection Agency.
HALL OF FAME
Induction into the BV Hall of Fame 
recognizes CPAs whose lifetim e 
achievements and
c o n t r ib u t io n s  
have significantly 
advanced the 
business valuation 
discipline. This 
year’s inductees 
are Tom Hilton 
and Eva Lang.
Tom H ilton,
CPA/ABV, ASA,
CVA, is a partner with Anders, Min­
kler & Diehl LLP, St. Louis Missouri. 
He is recent past chair of the AICPA 
Business Valuation Committee and is 
currently, a member of the AICPA 
Business Valuation, Forensic & Litiga­
tion Services Executive Committee. 
He has also been involved with 
numerous boards and committees of 
the AICPA and other organizations.
Eva Lang, CPA/ABV, ASA, is 
executive director of the Financial 
Consulting Group. She is the first 
woman to be inducted into the BV 
Hall of Fame. Ms. 
Lang is a nation­
ally recognized 
expert on elec­
tronic  research  
for business valu­
ation and litiga­
tion support ser­
vices. She speaks 
frequen tly  toEva Lang
BV Standards and the New  
BV/FLS Web Site
Proposed AICPA Business Valua­
tion Standards and the new 
B V/FLS community Web s ite  
(www.aicpa.org/BVFLS) were among the 
topics covered at the AICPA  
National Business Valuation Con­
ference in Orlando, Florida, Novem­
ber 7-9, 2004. A preliminary draft 
of the proposed BV standards was 
presented to and discussed with 
the members in attendance. Mem­
bers will be apprised of when the 
standards are issued as a public 
exposure draft for their comments.
The benefits and richness of the 
new Web site were also discussed 
and demonstrated. But see for 
yourself; go to www.oicpa.org/BVFLS.
national groups on technology issues 
and is a contributing editor to CPA 
Expert. She writes a “Web Site of the 
Month” column for the AICPA ABV 
E-Valuation Alert and she is a co­
author of The Best Web sites for Finan­
cial Professional published by John 
Wiley & Sons (Hoboken, New Jer­
sey). In add ition , Ms. Lang has 
served on the AICPA Business Valua­
tion and Appraisal Subcommittee, as 
well as CPA committees at the state 
level in the areas of estate planning, 
litigation services, and management 
consulting services.
Upcoming ABV Exam
More than 100 practitioners took 
the examination for the Accredited 
in Business Valuation credential, 
which was administered between 
November 15  and 30. The next 
exam is scheduled for June 20-25, 
2005 . Registration for the June 
exam opened on December 1 and 
will remain open until some time in 
April. For more information, visit 
w w w .aicpa .o rg /B V F L S /e v e n ts . This site  
offers access to information on the 
ABV application process and the 
ABV competency assessment tool, 
as well as on the exam registration 
process.
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FYI
NEW GUIDANCE FOR 
INTERPRETATION 101-3: 
NONATTEST SERVICES
As of December 31, 2004, practition­
ers will be required to document in 
writing the understanding estab­
lished with the client under General 
Requirement No. 3 of Interpretation 
101-3, Nonattest Services. The AICPA 
has continually updated its Web site 
with new information for firms seek­
ing clarification on how to comply. 
Keep w atching the Web site, 
www.aicpa.org/members/div/ethics/intr_101-3.htm , 
for a competency white paper and 
representation and engagement let­
ter examples, which are expected 
soon. Both should greatly assist firms
with Interpretation 101-3.
If you have questions, issues, or
concerns not addressed at the site, 
send an email to ethics@aicpa.org.
APPLICATION PROCESS 
BEGINS FOR COMMITTEE 
SERVICE
May 1, 2005 is the deadline for applying 
to serve during the next committee year 
(October 2005-October 2006).
Members interested in contributing 
to their profession and networking 
with their peers have the opportu­
nity to do so by applying to serve on 
an AICPA committee or panel in the 
nex t com m ittee year (O ctober 
2005-October 2006). This year there 
are several new committees and pan­
els to choose. To avoid conflicts with 
tax season, the application period is
open until May 1, 2005. You can 
apply online: Go to volunteers.aicpa.org to 
complete a brief Web-based applica­
tion. Address inquiries to David Ray 
at 212-596-6030 or dray@aicpa.org.
Much to Our Regret
Because of a previous commitment 
of Jim Hitchner, CPA Expert can 
not publish the succeeding parts of 
his article, “Cost of Capital Contro­
versies,” which appeared in the 
Fall 2004 issue.
Although this is our loss, readers 
can still gain the benefits of Jim’s 
insights: The succeeding parts of 
the article will appear in upcoming 
issues of Shannon Pratt’s Business 
Valuation Update.
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